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SUBSIDIARITY AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN-RIGHTS COURTS: RESPECTING 
SELF-GOVERNANCE AND PROTECTING 




Several regional and international courts (ICs) and treaty bodies are 
empowered to review whether a state’s legislation and policies are consistent 
with the human-rights conventions it has signed. Such human-rights review 
presents both theoretical and practical puzzles concerning the tensions between 
protecting human rights and respecting democratic sovereignty. These 
dilemmas are central to discussions about how both the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR) interpret and apply their respective conventions: the European and 
the American Conventions on Human Rights (ECHR and ACHR).1 Academics 
and politicians have criticized both ICs for their alleged illegitimate 
intervention into well-functioning democracies, most famously by the United 
Kingdom in its 2012 proposal that states in the Council of Europe should 
severely prune the authority of the ECtHR.2  
Scholars, politicians, and judges often use conceptions of subsidiarity as a 
normative framework for assessing how to allocate and exercise authority 
within a multilevel political and legal order. Principles of subsidiarity 
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 1.  Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14) 
[hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]; Organization of American States, American 
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36.   
 2.  Council of Europe, High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human 
Rights⎯Draft Brighton Declaration, ¶ 23(c)(i), Feb. 23, 2012; see Jorge Contesse, Contestation and 
Deference in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 
123, 125 (discussing debates as to the proper scope of ECtHR authority); Roberto Gargarella, La 
democracia frente a los crímenes masivos: una reflexión a la luz del caso Gelman, 2 REV. 
LATINOAMERICANA DE DER. INT’L 1, 8–10, May 29, 2015.  
7-FOLLESDAL INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/13/2016  3:14 PM 
148 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:147 
unanimously espouse a presumption of authority at more local levels, but they 
differ on important details. This article considers how subsidiarity may be 
brought to bear on the challenges the ECtHR and the IACtHR face. The article 
focuses on two politically salient, normative questions. First, should states—
even well-functioning democracies—subject themselves to ICs with the 
authority to interpret and adjudicate alleged violations of relevant human-rights 
treaties? Second, is it is consistent with their mission of protecting human rights 
that ICs grant the states some discretion, that is, a “margin of appreciation,”3 or 
does such discretion nullify the human-rights protection the ICs were 
established to provide? 
This article suggests that states have subsidiarity-based rationales for 
binding themselves to ICs and that the ICs should grant states a conditional 
margin of appreciation with respect to certain human rights. A historical and 
empirical backdrop explains how these ICs can protect human rights while 
being duly deferential to state sovereignty, even for states with minimal 
democratic credentials. Subsidiarity considerations identify the authority a 
human-rights court or treaty body should enjoy as well as limits it should face. 
In particular, subsidiarity arguments help delineate the margin of appreciation 
that the ECtHR grants states in determining whether certain human-rights 
violations have occurred. 
The discussion of these ICs lends support to several of the assumptions 
concerning subsidiarity outlined in this issue’s introduction.4 Part II provides an 
overview of some of the discussions concerning the concept of subsidiarity. Part 
III lays out some explanatory subsidiarity arguments—reasons why states have 
agreed to self-binding by human-rights ICs—and discusses why these arguments 
have become more contested. Part IV presents some relevant features of the 
ECtHR and its history, including its margin-of-appreciation doctrine, and part 
V explains how the ECtHR addresses the dilemma of protecting democratic 
sovereignty while protecting human rights by considering when and why 
democratic decisions merit deference. Part VI concludes, discussing some of the 
implications for how subsidiarity arguments apply to human rights and 
considering in more detail the six conjectures from this issue’s introduction. 
II 
SUBSIDIARITY 
Principles of subsidiarity, theorems in normative political theory, urge a 
rebuttable presumption for the local. Local authorities should enjoy as much 
authority as possible, so long as it is consistent with achieving the particular, 
 
 3.  Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 56 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 240 (1996) [hereinafter Brems, The Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine]. 
 4.  See Markus Jachtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 1. 
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normatively permitted or required objectives of the relevant IC.5 The burden of 
argument, due to this presumption for the local, thus rests with proponents of 
centralized authority. Beyond these broad statements, different conceptions of 
subsidiarity vary drastically in how they formulate this presumption. Generally, 
central bodies must offer comparable effectiveness or efficiency when they 
exercise authority over the constituent bodies, but conceptions diverge as to 
who decides on the objectives; whether central authority is required; and, if 
such authority is required, what kind. Consider, for instance, the scope of issues 
of concern: the relations between the head of family and the individual 
members, the powers of the central unit in relation to federation members, or 
the power of an international human-rights court over the states that have 
submitted to the court’s governing human-rights treaty. The normative 
conception of subsidiarity used here is person centered rather than state 
centered. Authority should be placed with states or international bodies only 
insofar as such centralization better promotes and protects the interests of 
individual persons rather than states.6 Thus, constraints imposed by human-
rights ICs on state sovereignty are justified only insofar as they promote and 
protect individuals’ interests better than would a state system without ICs.7 
A separate yet related role of subsidiarity is as an explanatory hypothesis to 
explain why certain actors subject themselves to international bodies. 
Empirically, it is usually only when actors are convinced that their interests are 
served by placing some authority with a regional or international body that 
delegate authority to it.8 Thus, explanatory subsidiarity, which views states and 
the interests of their governments as the fundamental explanatory units within a 
soft rationalist framework, accounts for several features of international law—
not only in the area of human rights, but also arguably more generally.9 These 
features include a prevalent understanding of the centrality of state consent in 
creating such legal obligations10—the requirement that national remedies must 
be exhausted before turning to international courts and treaty bodies11—and the 
often-weak treaty sanctions.12 
 
 5.  Andreas Føllesdal, Survey Article: Subsidiarity, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 190, 191 (1998). 
 6.  Andreas Føllesdal, The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in International 
Law, 2 GLOBAL CONST. 37, 61−62 (2013). 
 7.  See id. 
 8.  BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC 
POLITICS 12−13 (2009).  
 9.  Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 
AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 40 (2003); Føllesdal, supra note 6, at 61. 
 10.  IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (6th ed. 2003); Luigi Crema, 
Disappearance and New Sightings of Restrictive Interpretation(s), 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 681, 699 (2010); 
Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 912 (2004); Andreas von Staden, The Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review 
Beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards of Review, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1023, 
1025 (2012).  
 11.  Cf. Contesse, supra note 2, at 129–30, 133 (discussing general requirement to exhaust domestic 
remedies before bringing case to international system).  
 12.  See Carozza, supra note 9, at 62–63 (discussing lack of definitive international interpreters or 
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Another expression of explanatory subsidiarity may be the ECtHR practice 
of granting states a margin of appreciation when assessing whether they are in 
compliance with their obligations. But this gives rise to two central questions: 
First, is this court-established doctrine consistent with the states’ transfer of 
authority to the ECtHR? And, second, if not, is it nonetheless justifiable as a 
way for the court to defer to democratic rule? 
This article addresses explanatory subsidiarity mainly from a normative 
perspective, recognizing that states may have an interest both in maintaining a 
broad scope of autonomy and in restraining the power of the ECtHR and the 
IACtHR. The practice of granting states a margin of appreciation may be 
justified by normative subsidiarity arguments ultimately based on protecting 
and promoting individuals’ interests. This argument first requires considering 
the rationale for why states should submit to human-rights ICs, if at all, and 
then calls for exploring the reasons why these courts should grant states some 
such margin of discretion. 
III 
WHY STATES BIND THEMSELVES TO HUMAN-RIGHTS ICS AND WHY THESE 
RATIONALES BECOME LESS SALIENT 
The normative issues concerning international human-rights review and the 
margin of appreciation may best be approached by considering why states 
subject themselves to regional human-rights conventions and their treaty 
bodies, such as the ECtHR and the IACtHR, and why states have recently 
become more critical to such subjection. 
States have established many treaties with ICs to help alleviate collective-
action problems among and within states.13 For example, ICs promote trade 
within the European Union (EU) or the World Trade Organization.14 An 
independent and impartial authoritative body can help resolve prisoners’ 
dilemmas and free-rider fears between states in the commercial context by 
monitoring compliance, reviewing domestic legislation and administrative 
decisions, and interpreting and adjudicating agreements that mutually bind the 
disputing states.15 Thus, states agree to be bound by ICs to ensure that other 
states do likewise and to secure otherwise unattainable mutually beneficial 
results. 
However, human-rights ICs do not fit this model. Rather, the ECtHR and 
the IACtHR adjudicate disputes between individuals and their own states 
 
enforcers of international rights); Føllesdal, supra note 6, at 56.  
 13.  Laurence R. Helfer, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Theory of Constrained 
Independence, in CONFERENCES ON NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 253, 260 (Mohr Siebeck ed., 2006). 
 14.  Giandomenico Majone, State, Market and Regulatory Competition in the European Union: 
Lessons for the Integrating World Economy, in CENTRALIZATION OR FRAGMENTATION?: EUROPE 
FACING THE CHALLENGES OF DEEPENING, DIVERSITY, AND DEMOCRACY 94, 120−21 (Andrew 
Moravcsik ed., 1998).  
 15.  Karen J. Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding Delegation, 
71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2008, at 49.  
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regarding whether the states have complied with relevant conventions, and 
review the compatibility between conventions and national laws and practices. 
These ICs do not address collective-action problems among states. Instead, 
states submit to these courts in order to enhance their own credibility as human-
rights–committed legal and political orders. Thus regional human-rights courts 
help the states bind themselves, rather than other private or public actors. 
When a state constrains its sovereignty in this way, it is “both a self-binding pre-
commitment on the part of the legislature, and an other-binding choice made to 
bind future legislative actors and units within the political system to the 
constitutional bargain.”16 
A state may want to use an IC to provide such assurance to many relevant 
public audiences. First, a state may bind itself to an IC to enhance trust in its 
domestic population that the particular government is committed to human 
rights and that future generations of its government will remain committed. A 
second important audience is comprised of opposing political parties that might 
otherwise pursue human-rights–violating platforms. Indeed, several states 
originally wanted to give the ECtHR more significant powers than those with 
which it was originally equipped precisely for that reason: to “lock in” human 
rights as a constraint on future governments.17 Furthermore, a state may ratify 
human-rights conventions to gain “legitimacy in the eyes of other states.”18 The 
fear of illegitimacy may be especially acute when almost all other states have 
signed a convention, resulting in a stigma attaching to nonsignatory states.19 In 
the case of the European Convention on Human Rights, reputational concerns 
were supplemented with material benefits because the ECtHR gradually 
became a gatekeeper to the Council of Europe.20 In order to provide such an 
assurance of liberalized democracy, the IC must be sufficiently independent of 
the states it reviews.21 In particular, the states should not be the final interpreter 
of a convention, or the attempt to provide assurance to other audiences will fail. 
If a state no longer needs an IC to maintain credibility with the various 
audiences, the state will naturally seek to limit the relevant court’s ability to 
constrain state sovereignty. For example, in the Americas in the 1990s the 
political opposition shifted from an authoritarian regime-in-waiting, to other 
parties equally committed to human rights.22 Thus, the governments committed 
 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar 
Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 220 (2000). 
 18.  Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The 
Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373, 1384 (2005). 
 19.  See SIMMONS, supra note 8, at 13 (discussing the “social and political pressures of remaining 
aloof from a multilateral agreement to which most of [a state’s] peers have already committed”). 
 20.  Alter, supra note 15, at 66. 
 21.  See Helfer, supra note 13, at 257 (“[I]ndependent tribunals provide a mechanism to enhance 
the credibility of the otherwise less than fully credible promises that governments make to one 
another.”). 
 22.  See Contesse, supra note 2, at 130 (explaining the transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy). 
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to democratic rule no longer needed the IACtHR as a last resort to remedy 
future massive human-rights violations.  
These historical changes help explain the surge in criticism of both the 
IACtHR and the ECtHR. Critics assert that these ICs intervene too forcefully 
into issues that should not be subject to international judicial review.23 Instead, 
critics argue that the respective courts should grant the states a broader margin 
of appreciation. 
For example, scholars have noted two historical changes in the violations 
brought to the ECtHR.24 The Court was originally established as 
an “early warning system” to prevent states from lapsing into totalitarianism. It set out 
the fundamental rights and freedoms that states should secure to everyone in their 
jurisdiction, and provided a judicial enforcement system—the European Court of 




As the states developed into strong, generally well-functioning democracies, 
though, the ECtHR’s role changed to helping correct their minor flaws as 
regards human-rights violations. With the crop of new states that joined the 
Council of Europe, the Court was required to refocus its efforts to “consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law in new and relatively fragile democracies.”26 
Once the new member states joined the EU, some joined the ranks of critics, 
complaining about the sovereignty constraints imposed by the ECtHR as 
politicized attacks.27 
These changes help explain growing number of calls to reduce the 
competences of the human-rights ICs in both jurisdictions. Critics have argued, 
for example, that the IACtHR should be more deferential to decisions 
emerging from high-quality democratic processes28 and should defer to the 
states’ interpretations or applications of the Convention,29 in effect granting 
states a margin of appreciation in such cases. 
Similarly, in preparation for a 2012 Council of Europe meeting, the United 
Kingdom proposed that the ECtHR should grant states a broad margin of 
appreciation and that the Court should no longer have the ultimate authority to 
interpret the ECHR.30 Rather, the United Kingdom urged that the Court should  
 
 23.  See generally Roberto Gargarella, In Search of Democratic Justice: What Courts Should Not 
Do: Argentina, 1983–2002, in DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY 
FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 181 (Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella & Elin Skaar 
eds., 2004). 
 24.  See generally LORD WOOLF, REVIEW OF THE WORKING METHODS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2005). 
 25.  Id. at 7.  
 26.  Id. at 9.  
 27.  Julia Lapitskaya, ECHR, Russia, and Chechnya: Two Is Not Company and Three Is Definitely 
a Crowd, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 479, 499 (2011). 
 28.  Gargarella, supra note 2, at 9–11.  
 29.  Contesse, supra note 2, at 133 (indicating that the Inter-American Court has asserted its own 
authority as the final interpreter of the American Convention). 
 30.  Council of Europe, Draft Brighton Declaration, supra note 2. 
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override a state’s interpretation only if the “national court clearly erred in its 
interpretation or application of the Convention rights.”31 
The United Kingdom’s suggestions have received mixed responses. Former 
President of the IACtHR and current International Court of Justice judge 
Cançado Trindade has objected to the IACtHR’s use of the margin-of-
appreciation doctrine.32 Likewise, several authors regard this doctrine as an 
abdication by the ECtHR. They argue, 
[W]here national procedures are notoriously prone to failure, most evident when 
minority rights and interests are involved, no margin and no consensus should be 
tolerated. Anything less than the assumption of full responsibility would amount to a 
breach of duty by the international human rights organs.
33
 
The United Kingdom’s initiative did not constrain the ECtHR as much as 
the draft recommended: The states agreed to Protocol No. 15, not yet in force, 
which refers to an ECtHR-established margin-of-appreciation doctrine and to 
subsidiarity in the Preamble of the Convention.34 But no changes were made 
concerning the ultimate authority on interpreting the ECHR—that remains the 
ECtHR—contrary to the United Kingdom’s proposal.35 
How can a normative principle of subsidiarity help assess these proposals? 
The answer requires more relevant details about the ECtHR and the margin-of-
appreciation doctrine. 
IV 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARD MORE INDEPENDENCE 
YET MORE DEFERENCE TO STATES VIA THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
The ECtHR is the most powerful of the human-rights ICs because it issues 
legally binding judgments. The express role of the Court is subsidiary vis-à-vis 
the states. The Court shall “ensure the observance of the engagements 
undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the 
Protocols.”36 This complex role has required a combination of independence 
from and subservience to the states.37 
The ECtHR has gradually increased its autonomy, which no doubt has 
 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  ANTONIO A. CANCADO TRINDADE, EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS 
HUMANOS EN EL SIGLO XXI 390 (2009).  
 33.  Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 843, 853–54 (1998–99). 
 34.  Council of Europe, Protocol No. 15 Amending the Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, pmbl., June 24, 2013. 
 35.  Council of Europe, Draft Brighton Declaration, supra note 2; cf. European Convention on 
Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 19. 
 36.  European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1. 
 37.  Id. art. 21, ¶¶ 2–3; Helfer, supra note 13 at 263; Erik Voeten, International Judicial 
Independence, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 421, 438 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark Pollack 
eds., 2013). 
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fuelled the protests from some states. Originally, individuals could make 
complaints to the European Commission on Human Rights, which would 
forward to the ECtHR those complaints it found admissible.38 In 1990, Protocol 
No. 9 allowed individuals to bring cases directly,39 and in 1998, Protocol No. 11 
both rendered the Court a full-time institution to allow it to handle more cases 
and abolished the Commission.40 
The Court has also engaged in dynamic interpretation of the ECHR, 
reading far more rights into it than the states would have envisioned in the 
1950s.41 The ECtHR has held, for example, that the Convention prohibits 
corporal punishment,42 human trafficking,43 and certain forms of religious 
teaching in public schools,44 and that it protects the right not to join a trade 
union.45 
Notwithstanding trends of increasing independence from states, the ECtHR 
has not always sought to maximize its autonomy and powers of judicial human-
rights review. In particular, the Court has developed the margin-of-appreciation 
doctrine, which urges the Court to defer to the domestic judiciary’s assessment 
of whether there is a breach of the Convention.46 
Many trace the doctrine back to the 1958 Cyprus case,47 in which the 
Commission asserted that under the derogation clause in Article 15, U.K. 
 
 38.  ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM 
ITS INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 69 n.109 (2010). 
 39.  Id. at 167. 
 40.  Id. at 460–62. 
 41. See  Janneke Gerards, Judicial Deliberations in the European Court of Human Rights, in THE 
LEGITIMACY OF HIGHEST COURTS’ RULINGS: JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS AND BEYOND 407, 429 
(Nick Huls, Maurice Adams & Jaco Bomhoff eds., 2009) (“the Convention is a living instrument which 
. . . must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.” (quoting Tyrer vs. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A/26) 1, 12 (1978))). 
 42.  Tyrer, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 31. 
 43.  Rantsev v. Cyprus & Russia, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 65, 124. 
 44.  Folgero v. Norway, App. 2007-IIIEur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 94. 
 45.  Young, James & Webster v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7601/76; 7806/77, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 38, 
55 (1981). 
 46.  For more in-depth accounts and criticisms, see YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF 
APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE ECHR (2001); STEVEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 
ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (2006); GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF 
INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2007); Yutaka Arai-
Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: A Theoretical Analysis of Strasbourg’s Variable 
Geometry, in CONSTITUTING EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NATIONAL, 
EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXT 62 (Andreas Føllesdal et al. eds., 2013); Brems, The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine, supra note 3, at 240; Eva Brems, Transitional Justice in the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 5 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 282 (2011); Eva Brems & Laurens 
Lavrysen, Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The European Court of Human Rights, 35 
HUM. RTS. Q. 176 (2013); George Letsas, The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and 
Legitimacy, in CONSTITUTING EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NATIONAL, 
EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXT 106 (Andreas Føllesdal et al. eds., 2013).  
 47.  Greece v. United Kingdom, App. No. 176/56, 326 (1958), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
73858. 
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authorities enjoyed a certain measure of discretion to assess the extent of rights 
violations justified by the public-emergency situation. The Court developed the 
doctrine and its rationale more fully in cases heard in the 1960s.48 
The ECtHR reviews whether state legislation or policy that appears to 
violate the Convention has acceptable objectives and whether the legislation is 
proportionate to the objectives pursued.49 Generally, only when the Court is 
convinced that the state has performed a satisfactory proportionality test, will 
the ECtHR defer to the domestic judiciary’s decision.50 
Several central aspects of the margin-of-appreciation doctrine are important 
in assessing it. The ECtHR rarely offers a margin of appreciation for violations 
of the nonderogable rights to life or the rights against torture, slavery, or forced 
labor.51 The ECtHR is also very restrictive in granting a margin of appreciation 
for rights concerning political participation, freedom of expression, and other 
rights required for well-functioning democratic decisionmaking. 52 
Several ECHR rights explicitly provide for exceptions.53 More specifically, 
the ECtHR claims that the margin-of-appreciation doctrine is particularly 
appropriate in three main scenarios in which domestic authorities are better 
suited to judge given that they have conducted a proportionality assessment:54 
1. When ‘balancing’ against other urgent issues such as emergencies, public 
safety, the economic well-being of the country, as permitted by Articles 
8, 9, and 10; 
2. When balancing different rights against each other;55 
3. When applying the human-rights norms to specific circumstances of a 
state. 
 
 48.  See generally Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71 (1978), http://hudoc.echr.coe 
.int/eng?i=001-57506; Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 737 
(1979–80); see also Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 15, 58  (1979–80) 
(examining contours of discretion under derogation clause). 
 49.   ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 46, at 200; see ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF 
APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 142 
(2012). 
 50.  See Dickson v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 99,  130 (holding that where Parliament 
had not made a proportionality assessment, “[the policy was] seen as falling outside any acceptable 
margin of appreciation”). 
 51.  European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, arts. 2–4. 
 52.  Observer & Guardian v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13585/88, 53 (1991) (Pekkanen, J., partly 
dissenting), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57705 (“[T]aking into account the vital importance in a 
democratic society of freedom of expression and freedom of the press, the State’s margin of 
appreciation in these cases is very narrow indeed.”); see also Handyside, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 
754–55  (“The Court’s supervisory functions oblige it to pay the utmost attention to the principles 
characterizing a ‘democratic society.’”).  
 53.  European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, arts. 8–10. 
 54.  For thorough and systematic overviews, see Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine, 
supra note 3 and Dean Spielmann, Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights 
and the National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?, 14 
CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 381 (2011–12).  
 55.  Lillo-Stenberg & Saether v. Norway, App. No. 13258/09, 88 (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe. 
int/eng?i=001-140015.  
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States may be justified in violating some individuals’ rights but only if the 
restrictions on rights are proportionate to certain acceptable social objectives or 
other rights.56 When the ECtHR seeks to decide this, it must determine whether 
the state’s policy minimizes the violation of rights required to achieve the 
objectives.57 
The ECtHR has specified an additional important requirement for granting 
states a margin of appreciation: that the state must give evidence of this 
proportionality test.58 The state must have assessed whether there is 
proportionality or a “fair balance” between the means and the end sought.59 
Case law has developed five elements of this proportionality test: 
1. The legitimacy of the social objective pursued; 
2. How important the restricted or derogated right is, for example, as a 
foundation of a democratic society; 
3. How invasive the proposed interference will be; 
4. Whether the restriction of the right is necessary; 
5. Whether the reasons offered by the national authorities are relevant and 
sufficient.60 
 
The ECtHR also assesses whether the state has carried out these steps in a 
substantively satisfactory way.61 Indeed, the Court sometimes holds that a state’s 
test is unacceptable.62 
But the Court may decide against granting a margin of appreciation if the 
legislation or policy at hand runs counter to an observed emerging consensus in 
Europe, sometimes expressed as “the existence or non-existence of common 
ground between the laws of the Contracting States.”63 When it perceives such a 
consensus, the Court may require the accused state to provide an even more 
convincing argument for its policies,64 but the Court has also ruled against 
accused states on this ground.65 The Court’s attention to emerging consensus 
 
 56.  See Dickson v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 122 (explaining that some public 
legitimate aims “necessarily involve[] some limitation on an individual’s rights”). 
 57.  Animal Defs. Int’l v. United Kingdom, 2013-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 203, 227–28.  
 58.  Lindheim & Others v. Norway, App. No. 13221/08; 2139/10, 61 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 37 (2015). 
 59.  Animal Defs. Int’l, 2013-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 228. 
 60.  See Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 737, 755 
(1979–80) (explaining that intrusions in certain spheres must be “proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued”). 
 61.  Animal Defs. Int’l, 2013-II Eur. Ct. H.R.. at 227–28. 
 62.  A v.  Norway, App. No. 28070/06, 74 (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92137. 
 63.  Rasmussen v. Denmark, App. No. 8777/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 371, 380 (1985); Brems, The 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine, supra note 3, at 263; see also X,Y & Z v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
21830/93 (1997), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58032 (granting wide margin of appreciation to 
contracting states with differing laws). 
 64.  Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 317 (1997–98).   
 65.  Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A/26) 1, 31 (1978). 
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may be a good way to check its dynamic interpretation of the ECHR. However, 
the Court does not appear to have an established procedure to ascertain the 
requisite consensus. And critics claim that the weight of the consensus factor is 
indeterminate.66 
Before moving to a normative assessment of the margin-of-appreciation 
doctrine as part of the ECtHR’s practice, consider what may have motivated 
the Court to develop such a complex procedure. The judges may have had at 
least two, possibly compatible, objectives. First, the Court may have developed 
this doctrine to build its legitimacy by avoiding controversial decisions against 
powerful actors. However, this alone cannot explain the limits of the doctrine 
and its complex features and conditions.  The Court’s margin-of-appreciation 
doctrine goes beyond what a simple avoidance strategy would predict because  
these aspects are justified as elements of the subsidiary role of the ECtHR vis-à-
vis the member states. These features can thus be better explained by the 
judges’ attempts to pursue the Court’s objectives as defined in the ECHR: to 
bolster the domestic authorities’ respect for human rights and to help protect 
individuals against human-rights violations. Note that this role of the ECtHR as 
a mechanism for states to bind themselves to certain standards does not 
incentivize the Court to impose ever-stricter requirements on the states. To the 
contrary, the margin-of-appreciation doctrine expresses a principle of 
subsidiarity regarding the Court’s respect for democratic decisionmaking. 
V 
DUE RESPECT FOR DEMOCRACY: THE CONDITIONAL CASE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL RIGHTS REVIEW 
Several Council of Europe states rate poorly on “democratic quality.”67 The 
case for a review body such as the ECtHR to protect citizens’ human rights 
seems more plausible for these states. But for well-functioning democracies, the 
ECtHR’s practices, including the margin-of-appreciation doctrine, appear odd: 
objectionably antidemocratic and not sufficiently protective of human rights. 
To justify the ECtHR’s role and authority, one must first recall the reasons 
to value democratic rule and the conditions under which these arguments apply. 
It will then become clear that, in light of the reasons for valuing democracy, the 
criticism that the Court is antidemocratic does not hold up. 
Assume that democracy is a set of institutionally established procedures that 
regulate competition for control over political authority on the basis of 
deliberation where almost all adult citizens may participate as equals in an 
 
 66.  Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence, and the European Convention on Human Rights, 
26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 133, 139 (1993); see also Benvenisti, supra note 33, at 852 (“The consensus 
rationale . . . is but a convenient subterfuge.”). 
 67.  DEMOCRACY WATCH, www.democracywatch.ca (last visited Feb. 10, 2016); CENTER FOR 
SYSTEMIC PEACE, Polity IV Project, www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 
2016). 
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electoral mechanism.68 At least two reasons to respect such democratic self-
governance should give pause to international judicial review as done by the 
ECtHR. Indeed, the Court itself mentions several of them. The best 
instrumental argument for such democratic decisionmaking seems to be 
comparative. Democratic rule is, over time, more responsive to the best 
interests of all members of the political order than nondemocratic procedures. 
Such interests include self-determination and nondomination, as well as the 
security of basic needs and fairly shared benefits of social cooperation among 
inhabitants.69 Thus, respect for individuals’ interest in self-determination and 
nondomination is a concern the Court often acknowledges.70 A second 
argument in favor of local democratic decisionmaking is epistemic: those closer 
to real-world circumstances are better equipped to determine the policy choices 
that promote and protect the interests of those affected by those choices.71 
These arguments for democratic rule hold under only certain conditions. 
There are at least three reasons to be wary of unlimited majoritarian democratic 
rule, and in each case, an IC may help reduce the concern. First, the benefits of 
majority rule reliably accrue only from well-functioning democracies.72 An IC 
may be particularly important when such democratic institutions are not in 
place. Second, well-functioning majoritarian democratic procedures can 
deteriorate. An IC that monitors and safeguards the democratic process is thus 
consistent with valuing democracy.73 Third, even well-functioning democracies 
sometimes render flawed decisions, due to insufficient information in a 
particular case, ignorance, or even ill will. A body that seeks to prevent 
miscarriages of democratic deliberation and abuse of majority voting may thus 
provide important services. Majoritarian rule should especially be reviewed to 
ensure that the interests of minorities are sufficiently secured and promoted 
given the high probability that democratic decisions could be to their detriment, 
with minority interests and basic rights on the chopping block.74 
Respect for majoritarian democracy is compatible with review of decisions 
that violate the rights of minorities or the individual rights necessary for a well-
 
 68.  Cf. ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 37 (1998); Andreas Føllesdal & Simon Hix, Why 
There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik, 44 J. COMMON MKT. 
STUD. 533, 547–49 (2006). 
 69.  Cf. CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY 113 
(1989); Margaret Levi, A State of Trust, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE, 77, 94–96 (Margaret Levi & 
Valerie Braithwaite eds., 1998). 
 70.  See Hatton v. United Kingdom, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 189, 216 (explaining that 
democratic national authorities, rather than international courts, are better equipped to evaluate local 
needs). 
 71.  Wingrove v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 30–31 (1997); 
Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 737, 755 (1979–80). 
 72.  Characteristics of well-functioning democracies include, for example, the freedom of 
expression and a broadly dispersed right to vote. 
 73.  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 43 
(1980) (describing courts as “institution[s] charged with the evolution and application of society’s 
fundamental principles”).  
 74.  BRIAN BARRY, DEMOCRACY AND POWER: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY 339 (1989).  
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functioning democracy. And the ECtHR provides precisely that. The Court’s  
review enables states to better respect individuals’ human rights and other 
interests.75 
Judicial review by an IC like the ECtHR contributes to domestic human-
rights review in at least three ways.76 First, an IC is even more independent from 
the domestic government than the domestic judiciary and can provide citizens 
more trustworthy assurance of their government’s human-rights compliance. 
Second, the ECtHR can also enhance the independence and quality of the 
domestic judiciary with respect to human-rights protection by supporting its 
human-rights judgments against the state. Third, a state that subjects itself to 
the ECtHR thereby helps protect and promote the human rights of citizens in 
other European states by pressuring less democratic states to also consent to 
the Court’s authority.77 These three arguments apply a person-centered 
conception of subsidiarity; they support granting a body above the state certain 
authority in order to benefit the interests of individuals. 
Regarding the margin-of-appreciation doctrine, if international judicial 
review is so valuable, why limit it by granting states a margin of appreciation? 
Subsidiarity arguments help clarify this issue. Recall from part IV several 
relevant aspects. First the limited scope of application of the doctrine: some 
nonderogable rights are excluded. Violations of nonderogable rights arguably 
do not merit deference, and the ECtHR should instead protect these individual 
rights with full force. The margin of appreciation is likewise not granted for 
rights central to the functioning of democratic mechanisms. The ECtHR, then, 
only grants a margin when the state’s decisions reflect democratic deliberation. 
On the other hand, subsidiarity considerations suggest that states should 
remain the final arbiter of human-rights violations when the ECtHR cannot or 
is unlikely to provide better protection of human rights, because then the 
objectives are not better achieved by allocating that authority above the state. 
A state should enjoy a margin of appreciation for those circumstances in which 
domestic courts and other authorities are expected to be at least as well 
equipped and willing as the ECtHR to determine whether there is a violation of 
human rights. These circumstances match several features of the margin-of-
appreciation doctrine. The ECtHR claims that a margin of appreciation is 
particularly appropriate in those issue areas where domestic authorities are 
better suited to judge given that they have conducted a proportionality 
assessment.78 There is no general reason to suspect that a well-functioning 
democratic majoritarian system with an independent, competent judiciary will 
 
 75.  Helfer, supra note 13, at 262. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  SIMMONS, supra note 8, at 58. 
 78. Recall that a proportionality assessment involves balancing rights against urgent issues such as 
emergencies, public safety, and the economic well-being of the country; balancing different rights 
against each other; and applying the human-rights norms to specific circumstances within a state. See 
notes 54–57. 
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make rights-infringing decisions in these cases. An IC is not clearly more likely 
than domestic courts to properly apply the ECHR to such disputes. 
However, these instrumental and comparative arguments for respecting 
democratic decisions and domestic judicial review hold only when the 
appropriate deliberation and assessments have actually been carried out and 
when the legislature has explored alternative policies and their implications for 
human rights. Thus, there are good reasons for the ECtHR to grant a margin of 
appreciation only when it is convinced that domestic authorities have actually 
carried out a proper proportionality test. Indeed, this proportionality-test 
requirement may help nudge states into more careful public deliberation of the 
kind that gives citizens reason to value democratic decisions. If the legislature 
performs such a test, it is more likely to be granted a margin of appreciation and 
to avoid the embarrassment of being found in violation of the ECHR. The 
Court’s proportionality-test requirement may thus promote better democratic 
deliberation and bolster the effectiveness of domestic judicial scrutiny. 
The margin-of-appreciation doctrine may also weaken, but not refute, an 
argument against judicial review. The doctrine, at least when carefully specified 
and consistently applied, reduces the risk of states being subject to the arbitrary 
discretion of the judges of the ECtHR.  The proportionality requirement also 
guides judges’ discretion and thus reduces the possibility of arbitrariness. 
The ECtHR also faces general challenges concerning how subsidiarity 
should be applied when states have drastically different democratic credentials. 
Other human-rights ICs such as the IACtHR have long been faced with these 
challenges.79 In these circumstances, subsidiarity arguments may counsel more 
intervention and assistance to national authorities by the IC even though the IC 
may face more criticism from states and challenges to its authority. 
The margin-of-appreciation doctrine lets the ECtHR avoid some such 
controversial assessments. The doctrine focuses exclusively on the 
proportionality test performed by domestic authorities in the particular case 
being considered, disregarding whether the test is the normal mode of 
decisionmaking in that state. Arguments based on subsidiarity may conclude 
that such nudging may be more appropriate than more contentious assertions 
by the Court about the democratic quality of the state insofar as the Court’s 
role is to bolster domestic human-rights mechanisms and protect against 
human-rights violations among states that are generally committed to these 
values. Therefore, person-centered subsidiarity arguments support the limits to 
international review imposed by the ECtHR’s margin-of-appreciation doctrine. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
This article has considered the role of subsidiarity in international human-
rights courts, particularly the ECtHR, but also the IACtHR. Many ICs, for 
 
 79. See generally Contesse, supra note 2. 
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example those pertaining to trade, resolve various collective-action problems by 
ensuring that each state complies with agreed-upon standards. Human-rights 
ICs have a different main function when utilized by states. A state—even one 
with a well-functioning democracy—agrees to the authority of human-rights ICs 
largely to assure various audiences of their commitment to human rights. In 
examining how normative arguments for subsidiarity apply to human-rights ICs, 
this article explored how a person-centered conception of subsidiarity supports 
the ECtHR’s margin-of-appreciation doctrine. This doctrine limits the scope of 
the ECtHR’s human-rights review to issue areas where its review can better 
advance states’ protection and promotion of their citizens’ human rights than 
states’ domestic judicial review. The discussion about the ECtHR and its 
margin-of-appreciation doctrine thus illustrates how subsidiarity may support 
either centralization or decentralization, depending on whether the state has 
conducted a proportionality test. Without such a test, the presumption in favor 
of the local authority disappears, and the ECtHR neither will nor should grant a 
margin of appreciation. 
One upshot of these arguments is that a margin of appreciation may not be 
appropriate for international courts generally, notwithstanding other scholars’ 
arguments to the contrary.80 A convergence toward a margin-of-appreciation 
doctrine across ICs cannot be detected. Furthermore, the considerations in 
favor of a margin-of-appreciation doctrine do not obviously hold for ICs other 
than the ECtHR, as the ECtHR is significantly different from ICs established to 
address collective-action problems such as reducing barriers to international 
trade. States have good reason to be skeptical of granting each other discretion 
to determine their own compliance with such treaties where there are strong 
temptations for each state to free ride on the compliance of others. 
The discussion also sheds light on the conjectures made in this issue’s 
introduction. The ECtHR’s increased independence and the backlash in the 
form of the U.K.-led agreement on Protocol No. 15, which seeks to constrain 
the Court, lends credence to several, but not all, of the conjectures. 
Conjecture 1 holds that a vertical multilevel system with more significant 
authority at the global level will engender calls for subsidiarity to limit further 
expansion of IC authority. The concerns expressed by the United Kingdom and 
others leading to Protocol No. 15 exemplify conjecture one. As a multilevel 
system, the European human-rights regime has developed significant authority. 
At the same time, several states have less need for the credibility gained from 
self-binding arrangements. This has fueled an express demand for more 
decentralizing subsidiarity, with states therefore agreeing that the ECtHR 
should grant states a margin of appreciation in the Preamble of the ECHR.81 
The support for this change also exemplifies conjectures two and three. 
Conjecture 2 calls for subsidiarity to increase as state consent recedes—a mode 
 
 80.  Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 909 (2005). 
 81.  Council of Europe, Protocol No. 15, supra note 34, pmbl.  
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of legitimation, more so for delegated pooled authority. And conjecture 3 
suggests that demand for subsidiarity also increases when global institutions 
intervene deeper into specific local affairs. The human-rights ICs do indeed 
review a wide range of domestic legislation and policies, even more so as a 
result of dynamic interpretation. Thus, the ECtHR influences issues often 
regarded as core to state sovereignty, such as determining who should have the 
right to vote and prohibiting expulsion of suspected threats to national 
security.82 
Conjecture 4 holds that subsidiarity arguments in favor of leaving issues to 
local authorities are accepted to a greater degree when few negative 
externalities are present. This article suggests that Conjecture 4 applies to 
human-rights ICs due to their main role as a self-binding mechanism rather 
than as a response to a collective-action problem among states. The main topic 
of concern to the ECtHR is how states treat their own citizens, with few 
implications that impinge on other states. Thus, few states, if any, have 
registered strong objections to granting a margin of appreciation. 
Conjecture 5 asserts that powerful actors with strong interests in imposing 
uniform interpretation of regime rules upon other countries will protest 
subsidiarity, with less resistance by such actors indifferent to such uniformity. 
This is also consistent with the human-rights ICs, given their role as self-
commitment devices. No strong actors object to the margin-of-appreciation 
doctrine, partly because it does not lend itself to free riding among states. Only 
seldom would a state have a major interest in restricting other states’ human-
rights practices. This is one of the differences between the collective-action-
problem-solving ICs and the human-rights ICs. The main objective of the 
ECtHR is not to promote uniformity among states but, rather, to ensure 
human-rights standards in each state. Other states have little to lose by allowing 
variations as to how the standards are met, partly because there is no free-rider 
problem at stake among them. 
Conjecture 6 holds that central-level institutions that enjoy significant and 
stable institutional and political autonomy are unlikely to support subsidiarity 
arguments in favor of more local authority.  Regional human-rights courts such 
as the ECtHR seem to contradict this intuitively plausible conjecture. It was the 
ECtHR itself that initiated the margin-of-appreciation doctrine, which 
expresses such subsidiarity in favor of local autonomy. The Court has 
developed the doctrine since 1958—during periods when the Court has been 
autonomous and enjoyed broad support. Thus, the doctrine does not seem to be 
motivated only by a concern to avoid confrontations with powerful states. The 
complex scope and requirements of the margin-of-appreciation doctrine would 
not be expected if the Court introduced the doctrine only to maintain states’ 
support. However, these complexities are plausible—and defensible—in light of 
the subsidiary role of the ECtHR vis-à-vis states. The ECtHR helps states 
 
 82.  Aswat v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17299/12, 58 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 11 (2014); Hirst v. United 
Kingdom (II), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187, 198. 
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enhance their long-term credibility with various stakeholders, including 
domestic populations and other states. This has left the ECtHR with few 
institutional incentives to empower itself at the cost of state sovereignty. 
This article argued that the margin-of-appreciation doctrine with a 
proportionality test may provide a helpful, practical resolution of the dilemma 
the ECtHR faces of choosing between respecting democratic state sovereignty 
and promoting human rights. Considerations of subsidiarity help indicate how 
the margin-of-appreciation doctrine and the proportionality test may be 
defended in principle. Importantly, subsidiarity may also shed light on how 
international human-rights courts generally, and the ECtHR in particular, may 
be improved in practice. At the same time, this discussion has illustrated that 
appeals to a principle of subsidiarity do not settle the issue at hand or end the 
discussion. To the contrary, appeals to subsidiarity, at best, may help structure 
important debates about how to allocate and use authority in multilevel systems 
of global and regional governance. 
 
